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Introduction
Households in developing countries often face extreme income variation. This is specifically true for households whose income depends on agriculture and other economic activities susceptible to drastic weather variation. Domestic income shocks may come in the form of loss of job, illness, typhoons, drought, and rainfall variation. It is important to investigate how households cope with these shocks, especially in poor regions of developing countries where there is limited access to formal credit, capital, and insurance markets. Government aid and transfers can also be limited or non-existent.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine how Philippine households in rural areas insure their consumption against transitory income shocks caused by rainfall variation. To achieve this, I first examine whether household consumption is insured against adverse income shocks. Second, if households do insure their consumption, I
investigate whether they use remittances, informal credit, or their assets as ex post riskcoping mechanisms.
This paper adds to the literature on consumption insurance and risk-sharing by incorporating international remittances, domestic transfers, informal loans, and assets into this framework. There have been studies on how international remittances serve as insurance, independently of other risk-mitigating mechanisms (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Clarke and Wallsten, 2003; Yang and Choi, 2007) . To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates how international remittances, in relation to domestic transfers, informal credit and sale of assets, may insure household consumption. In doing so, this paper determines what the relative importance is of each of these risk-coping mechanisms and whether they affect each other or crowd each other out. 
Full insurance of consumption
Full consumption insurance is possible if households efficiently allocate their risks within their networks of family and friends. There is evidence that Philippine households receive help in response to income shocks mostly from informal networks of family and friends (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Yang and Choi, 2007) , making this an important kind of risk-sharing to investigate.
A Pareto-efficient allocation of risk exists if household consumption only depends on the average consumption that the networks of family and friends face and not on a household's own income. This implies that only aggregate risk faced by the networks of family and friends affects household consumption. Idiosyncratic income shocks are irrelevant because they are completely insured within the networks. Empirical studies often reject efficient allocation of risk for certain types of shocks and households because of this strong implication (Cochrane, 1991; Mace 1991; Townsend, 1994) . Partial
Pareto-efficient allocation of risk, however, may exist and households may employ riskcoping mechanisms.
Theory for full insurance of consumption
To test the existence of full consumption insurance among networks of family and friends, let i=1,…,N be the index of households, each with an uncertain income Following Cochrane (1991) , Mace (1991) , and Townsend (1994) , a relationship between individual household i's consumption and average consumption across households can be expressed as:
Equation (1) (Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Yang and Choi, 2007) . Given these assumptions and allowing for a random component, u i t , error term with zero mean, consumption insurance can be empirically tested using the following equation:
where transitory income, y iT st , is instrumented using rainfall shocks. 
Rainfall data
Rainfall data from PAGASA are used as a measure of shocks to transitory income of Philippine households. Several authors, such as Paxson (1992) , Paulson (2000) , and 
Estimation strategy for full insurance of consumption
Estimating Equation ( Two conditions must be satisfied to make the change in rainfall a valid instrument: it should be partially correlated to household income and uncorrelated to the disturbance term in Equation (3). To test the first requirement, change in income is regressed on change in rainfall. 1 Table 3 (first column) shows that the estimate for rainfall shocks is significantly different from zero, which meets the first requirement.
The second condition is satisfied because the rainfall shocks variable is exogenous to the causal system that constitutes how household income affects household consumption.
This means that the factors that affect rainfall variation are determined outside of Equation (3). (Yang and Choi, 2007) . I initially estimate the following Equation (4), which is derived from Equation 
Results for full insurance of consumption

Risk-coping strategies
Given that agricultural households insure their consumption to some degree, I
investigate three ex post mechanisms that they may use to insulate consumption against shocks to income: transfers from family and friends, informal loans from other families, and profits from selling their own assets. Data from FIES show that 77 percent of the agricultural households in the Philippines use one or a combination of these risk-coping strategies, which several different empirical studies also find to be in use. Some authors investigate risk-sharing among villagers through credit (Platteau and Abraham, 1987; Udry, 1990) . Others examine how self-insurance through saving, along with purchase and sale of assets, helps smooth consumption (Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) . The risk-coping mechanisms that I examine are closest to those used by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) . However, I distinguish domestic from international transfers to account for the role of international migrants in insuring origin households.
Theory for risk-coping strategies
Assume that household consumption is financed by own income ( 
Then Equation (1) can be expressed as:
To empirically test Equation (6) 
I test whether the coefficient of transitory component of income (y iT s ), which is instrumented using rainfall shocks, is significantly different from zero. If it is negative and significant, then households use the dependent variable as a tool to insure consumption against income shocks.
Description of data for risk-coping strategies
To test which risk-coping mechanisms households depend on, I examine the same panel data (for 2003 and 2006) I used in full consumption insurance analysis. Likewise, the same rainfall data are assigned to households. 
Estimation strategy for risk-coping strategies
To estimate Equation (7), I follow the identification strategy used in estimating household consumption. Fixed effects, which may cause a biased estimate for household income, exist if there is an unobservable omitted variable that jointly affects household income and international remittances, such as entrepreneurial spirit (Yang and Choi, 2007) . Such unobserved variable can also affect loans, domestic transfers, and assets. To Another source of a biased estimate for household income is reverse causation between risk-coping mechanisms and household income. For example, remittances may be used to fund entrepreneurial activities, which will then have an impact on household income (Yang and Choi, 2007) . Domestic transfers, informal loans, and sale of assets can also finance entrepreneurial endeavors of household members. Change in rainfall shocks is used as the instrumental variable for change in household income to account for reverse causation.
Results for risk-coping strategies
The risk-coping tools are measured as a change from 2003 to 2006 divided by income in 2003 so that they can be interpreted as replacement rate or percentage of fall in income that is replaced (Yang and Choi, 2007) . I perform multivariate regression analysis (2SLS) separately for international remittances, domestic transfers, loans, net loans, and net assets to test Equation (8) In Equation (9), a negative and significant estimate of ξ 2 suggests that an increase in rainfall shocks has an adverse effect on household income. In Equation (10), if δ 2 is equal to zero then the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance cannot be rejected.
If instead, δ 2 is negative and significant, then full consumption insurance is rejected.
However, some degree of insurance may exist if both δ 2 and ξ 2 are negative, significant, and ξ 2 >δ 2 , in absolute terms. This suggests that household consumption does not fall as much as income does when rainfall shocks increase because households may be using risk-coping strategies to mitigate the adverse effect of income shocks.
OLS regression results show that partial consumption insurance exists (Table 5 ).
An increase of 500 millimeters of rainfall results in a 7.8 percentage point decline in household income and a 5.7 percentage point fall in household consumption. These results show that, given a similar increment in rainfall, the decline in household consumption is less than-about 73 percent of-the decline in income. This suggests that about 27 percent of consumption is insured, which is consistent with the 2SLS results.
To determine whether remittances, loans, and assets are used as ex post mechanisms to insulate consumption, they are regressed separately on rainfall shocks. I estimate the following Equation (11) using OLS and applying the same independent variables used in Equations (9) and (10): mechanism. An OLS estimate on rainfall shocks is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level for the international remittances regression, which suggests that remittances serve as insurance when rainfall increases (Table 6 , first column). Although this estimate is small in magnitude (0.018), when compared to the rainfall shocks estimate in income regression (-0.156) in Table 5 (first column), this can be interpreted as replacing income decline by roughly 11 percent given an increase of 500 millimeters in rainfall. The rainfall estimates are significant in the loans and net loans regressions.
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However, the signs of the estimated coefficients are negative. These findings are consistent with the results using 2SLS. It is possible that loans are instead used as an ex ante mechanism to insulate consumption. During a good state of nature, households may borrow more money to invest in technologies and crops that are not susceptible to weather variation. This is to ensure a steady stream of income even during a bad state of nature.
I extend my analysis to all rural households (1,169 households), which encompass both agricultural and non-agricultural households. Using the same variables and applying a similar identification strategy as in the analysis of agricultural households, the results imply that some degree of consumption insurance exists. A 500-millimeter increase in rainfall causes a 6 percentage point decline in income and a 4 percentage point fall in consumption ( Table 7) . The OLS estimate on rainfall shocks in domestic transfers regression is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level (Table 8, second column). Comparing this estimate (0.017) with the rainfall shocks estimate in income regression (-0.124) in Table 7 (first column), the results suggest that domestic transfers replace about 14 percent of income decline given a similar increment in rainfall. Again, the coefficients of rainfall in loans and net loans regressions are significant but negative.
Conclusion
The goals of this paper are twofold: the first is to investigate whether agricultural households in rural Philippines insure their consumption against income shocks measured 21 by rainfall shocks. The second is to examine whether they use international remittances, domestic transfers, informal loans, or assets as ex post risk-coping mechanisms.
This paper contributes to the existing literature on risk-sharing by incorporating international remittances, domestic transfers, informal loans, and assets into this framework. Although there have been studies on how remittances serve as insurance, investigating how households use them relative to other risk-coping strategies can give new insights into the nature and efficacy of their role. Consequently, the insurance role of other risk-coping strategies relative to remittances is also explored.
It is imperative to examine how households in rural Philippines cope with extreme income variation given that they have limited access to formal credit, capital and insurance markets, and government assistance. A majority of these households depends on agriculture, and their income is sensitive to weather changes. Not only is the income of agricultural households dependent on weather variation, their income is minimal, oftentimes only enough to live at subsistence level. In addition, the Philippines has had its share of natural disasters (drought in 1997-1998, frequent typhoons, and earthquakes), which make farming households more vulnerable.
Using rainfall shocks as the instrumental variable for income shocks and based on the 2SLS results, this paper rejects full consumption insurance. Agricultural households, however, do insure their consumption to some degree: approximately 27 percent of consumption is insured. This result is consistent when reduced-form is estimated and household consumption is regressed on rainfall shocks. Agricultural households rely on their migrant family members for international transfers to cope with risks. 2SLS and OLS results show that international remittances replace roughly 11 percent of income 22 decline. Rural households (which include both agricultural and non-agricultural households), on the other hand, depend on domestic transfers when they encounter shocks to their income. About 14 percent of income decline is replaced by domestic remittances.
Agricultural households (and all rural households) do not depend on informal loans to share risks. Loans from other families decrease when rainfall increases. There are four possible reasons for this: first is that remittances crowd out loans. Remittances are most likely preferable and more convenient than loans because receiving households do not necessarily have to pay back the remitters. Second, borrowers and lenders may be experiencing similar shocks. If so, their incomes most likely have high covariance, which reduces the effectiveness of local risk-sharing arrangements (Bardhan and Udry, 1999) . Domestic migrants, on the other hand, most likely migrated to urban areas or places where rainfall shocks covary little or inversely with the ones experienced by agricultural households. This also explains how international migrants are able to insure their families, because their incomes are not directly affected by rainfall shocks in the Philippines. The third possible explanation is related to the creditworthiness of the borrowers. Lenders may be risk-averse and relatively less willing to lend during a bad state of nature. Fourth, loans are used instead as an ex ante mechanism in insulating consumption. It is possible that farmers borrow more money during a good state to use technologies (such as drought-resistant crops) or to diversify their activities (that is, to include non-farm activities) to guarantee a relatively more stable stream of income.
Agricultural households do not rely on sale of financial and real assets. This result can be attributed to how I measure assets, which is due to data limitation. One way 23 to extend this study in the future would be to use assets that are more useful and relevant to agricultural households, such as machinery or livestock.
Even though international remittances serve as a risk-coping tool, it is important Given that the regression analysis shows that these familial transfers are significant in insuring rural households, it would be helpful to improve on the banking system and informal channels to facilitate a less costly flow of domestic transfers.
One limitation of this paper is that the shocks that I am using are actually aggregate shocks that the entire municipality or city experiences. Because of this, it is possible that the sale of assets and credit are not as effective in coping with income risks, especially if the networks of family and friends belong to the same municipality or city and are thus experiencing the same negative income shock. A future examination of household-specific shocks would shed more light on the risk-coping behavior of rural households. The challenge, however, is finding an exogenous measure of these 24 idiosyncratic shocks. Another possible future line of research is one that addresses ex ante risk-coping mechanisms such as using new farming technologies, planting rapidly maturing crops, or diversifying activities, all of which may limit the impact of rainfall variation. Investigating these strategies would help to put the ex post mechanisms employed by farming households into perspective. 
